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  1 
Abstract 
 
The role of directors in Japanese companies is unique in a number of ways. One such 
characteristic is the dual nature of their role, which encompasses both monitoring and 
managing responsibilities. This paper considers their role in management. Empirical 
analysis with detailed data for each director studied reveals that directors take 
responsibility for performance, and that executive turnover is one of the main 
managerial incentive mechanisms. Abnormal turnover of a president does not cause 
further resignation among directors. Outside directors decrease the turnover-
performance sensitivity of presidents, suggesting their different role in corporate 
governance in Japan from that in the United States. 
 Keywords: Corporate Governance, Board of Directors, Turnover, Incentive Mechanism. 
(JEL G30, J53). 
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[1] Introduction 
 
It has long since been observed that the board of directors in Japanese 
companies are not only responsible for monitoring the company president as in the U.S., 
but are also involved in the management of the company.
3 This dual role is prescribed 
by the legal system. Article 260.1 of the Commercial Law stipulates, “[T]he board of 
directors shall determine the administration of company affairs, and supervise the 
execution of the duties of the directors.” Several characteristics of Japanese boards of 
directors, such as their relatively large size and the dominant role of insiders, can be 
attributed to the fact that the board is responsible for management.  
Although the above characteristics of Japanese companies have been long 
recognized, they have not been closely examined in previous studies. Most studies of 
management have focused on the company president. For example, in a very influential 
paper, Kaplan (1994) investigated the turnover of top executives in Japanese companies, 
finding a negative relation between turnover and performance. Later studies such as 
Kang and Shivdasani (1995) and Abe (1997) confirmed this result. These studies were 
based on evidence gleaned from U.S. data reported by Weisbach (1988), Gilson (1989), 
and Jensen and Murphy (1990) and did not consider the turnover of other directors on 
the board. While several studies, such as Morck and Nakamura (1999), have analyzed 
the monitoring role of directors sent by the “main bank,” there have to date been few 
studies made of directors as managers. 
                                                 
3 See, for example, Fukao and Morita (1997). 
  3In the U.S., since a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) wields extensive authority 
and is responsible for company performance, it follows that the corporate governance 
system might be analyzed by investigating the turnover or remuneration of CEOs. In the 
Japanese context, however, where not only the company president but the entire board 
takes responsibility for company performance, as prescribed by commercial law, an 
analysis overlooking the role of board members other than the president would likely 
miss some important features of managerial incentive mechanisms. Moreover, president 
turnover is a rare event in Japan. According to Kang and Shivdasani (1995), the annual 
likelihood of nonroutine president turnover is 3.1 %. Other related papers estimate it at 
less than 5%. This implies that turnover occurs less than once every 20 years. Such an 
infrequent event can hardly be argued to be the main governance mechanism in Japan. 
This paper analyzes the turnover of board members in Japan. If each board 
member takes responsibility for company performance, as prescribed by commercial 
law, we would expect to observe a negative relation between the likelihood of turnover 
and performance. Although there exist several studies on the appointment of board 
members sent by the “main bank,” such as Morck and Nakamura (1994), to the author’s 
knowledge this paper is the first attempt to investigate the turnover of all board 
members as a governance mechanism. 
There are several additional advantages to this approach. The first is its sample 
size. Since at least one board member resigns each year in almost all listed companies, it 
is possible to collect a large amount of turnover data, thus increasing the weight of the 
test statistics. The second is its consistency to related studies. An increasing number of 
papers have begun to investigate board compensation as part of the governance system 
in Japan. Most of these papers, such as Xu (1997), Murase (1998), and Abe, et al. 
  4(2001), have used the average compensation of the board.
4 In other words, they consider 
the entire board rather than simply the top executive to analyze governance mechanisms, 
finding a positive relation between pay and performance. These results are consistent 
with the hypothesis that the entire board is responsible for management. This paper, 
therefore, can be regarded as a natural extension of these previous studies of 
compensation. 
This paper also investigates relations between the president, the entire board, 
and outside board members. The main findings are as follows: (1) the likelihood of the 
turnover of board members is a decreasing function of firm performance; (2) the 
turnover of the top executive does not induce additional resignations among other board 
members; (3) the outside board members decreases the sensitivity of the turnover of top 
executives to firm performance. It is possible to interpret the first finding as proof of 
existence of a mode of corporate governance realized by the turnover of board members. 
The second result suggests that company presidents in Japan are not as powerful as their 
U.S. counterparts, and that the role of outside directors in management is limited. The 
third result is surprising since this is opposite to the results in the U.S. reported by 




                                                 
4 Their use of average remuneration might be due to limited data availability in Japan. Kato (1997) is 
a rare exception: instead of using average compensation he used the tax payments of top executives 
as proxies of remuneration. 
  5The sample used in this paper consists of all listed companies in manufacturing. 
The sample covers the 12-year period between 1990 and 2001 inclusive. Most data on 
board structures are taken from the Yakuin Shikihou (Quarterly Survey on Directors) 
complied by the Toyo Keizai Shinpou Sha. Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics with 
their data sources.
5
The Yakuin Shikihou contains detailed information on individual directors such 
as age, tenure, schooling, and position in the board.
6 As auditors are not allowed to take 
part in management, I have excluded them from the dataset.
7  
Turnover as shown in Table 1 is the ratio of the number of directors who resign 
to the total number of board members excepting auditors. Abnormal Turnover of 
President is a dummy variable that takes one if there is a president who resigns but does 
not stay on the board as chairperson.
8 An Outside Board Member is defined as a 
director who worked in a different company prior to his/her appointment as a director. 
Bank Board Dummy takes one if there is at least one director on the board from a bank, 
otherwise it takes zero. Outside President is also a dummy variable that takes unity if 
the president was outside the company when he was appointed as a board member, 
otherwise it takes zero.  
Table 2 shows the time variations for several key variables. We can observe 
several recent changes in the board over time. 
                                                 
5 I have dropped several observations with extremely large ROA or ROR from the sample. I have 
also dropped firms for which data on the age or tenure of the president is not available.  
6 The data is unique in its wide coverage. Information is available, for example, on each director’s 
hobbies and place of birth. Even after restricting the sample to the manufacturing industry, about ten 
thousand directors are listed each year. I assigned an individual index to each director in order to 
trace his/her movements among companies over time.  
7 Article 276 prohibits auditors from being directors, managers or any other employee of a company.  
8 Kaplan (1994) and other studies also use this type of definition for nonroutine turnover of a 
president. 
  6(1) Size 
The average size of boards of directors shows constant decline.
9 In 1990, the 
median size of the board was 13 members while in 2001 the median was 9. The rate of 
decline accelerated in 2000. The introduction of executive officers to the boardroom 
likely contributed to the decline. Prior to the major revision of the Commercial Law in 
2002, executive officers in Japan had had no legal prescription. I do not include 
executive directors in the sample because they had no legal obligations or 
responsibilities for managing and monitoring during the sample period. 
(2) Age and Tenure 
The average age of directors has been increasing, probably due to the overall 
aging trend in Japan. Interestingly, the average age of presidents has not increased and 
has, in fact, decreased. Another interesting contrast can be seen in the data for tenure. 
While the average tenure of directors is almost constant, that of presidents has shortened. 
Although the determination of age and tenure of presidents are not issues central to this 
paper, I suggest that these differences in trends can be related to changes in the roles of 
directors and presidents. 
(3) Presidents 
The likelihood of abnormal turnover of presidents has increased. During the 
sample period, the frequency increased by roughly 200%, from 0.023 to 0.070. This 
increase may be related to the decline in president tenure.  Using data from the late 
1980’s, Kang and Shivdasani (1995) calculate the frequency as 0.031, which does not 
differ greatly from the frequency in this sample. There is a slight increase in the ratio of 
                                                 
9 I exclude president and chairpersons from the board and treat them separately.  
  7presidents appointed from outside the company. The Appendix Table presents the 
correlation matrix of the variables, showing a negative correlation between outside 
presidents and their tenure. An increase in the appointment of outside presidents may be 
behind the decline in tenure. 
(4) Banks 
Relations between banks and companies have long been considered one of the 
most important governance mechanisms in Japan, known as the “main bank” system. 
Although recent studies have cast serious doubt on the effectiveness of the main bank 
system in governance, it is difficult to ignore these relations completely. The Bank 
Board Dummy in Tables 1 and 2 takes one if at least one director worked in a bank 
before his/her appointment to the board. It is worth noticing that since the sample does 
not contain auditors, a director coming from a bank is not auditing the company but 
working with the other board members. According to Table 2, despite the negative trend, 
more than 30% of listed companies in manufacturing have at least one director 
appointed from banks as full board members rather than as auditors.   
(5) Outside Directors 
The ratio of outside directors on the board in manufacturing firms has shown 
modest increase. 22% in 1990, it rose to 27 % by 2001. In view of the decline of board 
size over the same period, the actual number of outside directors on boards would seem 
to have remained fairly constant. Kaplan (1994) showed that the majority of directors 
are insiders, and there has been no significant change in board composition 
subsequently. 
(6) Turnover Rate 
Turnover rate at year t in Tables 1 and 2 is defined as follows: 
  8 
Turnover Rate (t) = (The number of directors who were on the board in t but were not 
in t+1)/(The number of board members in t). 
The turnover rate at year t of one company is calculated only when consecutive 
observations in both t and t+1 are available. Therefore, when a company ceases to exist, 
I exclude such a case and drop the observation. Although there is a level shift at year 
1998 in turnover rate, no definite trend can be observed in this variable. On average, 
10 % of board members resign during the sample period.  
 
[3] Determination of Turnover 
 
Where directors take responsibility for company performance, the likelihood of 
turnover should be a decreasing function of performance. Other factors that affect the 
likelihood of turnover include (1) director age and tenure, (2) the degree of autonomy or 
entrenchment of the board, and (3) liquidity in the job market. In order to control for the 
second factor, I include the ratio of shares held by board members and the Bank Board 
Dummy in the regression. The appointment of directors from banks might hinder the 
power of the board if the “main bank” hypothesis is correct. An increase in the ratio of 
shares held by board members obviously strengthens the power of the board in relation 
to that of other shareholders. As is clearly shown by Table 4, this ratio is very small. 
Although it is difficult to imagine that shareholding by the board would have an 
important overall effect, in view of relatively large standard deviations there may be 
some cases in which board shareholding significantly influences turnover.  
  9The third factor is difficult to control, but potentially very important in the 
determination of turnover. If the labor market for directors is highly liquid, a competent 
director foreseeing an unprofitable future for the company would likely flee the board 
like a rat deserting a sinking ship. Should such desertion occur, the negative relation 
between turnover and performance might be the result of the desertion rather than the 
result of the incentive mechanism. One way to avoid this problem is to use the lag of 
performance as predetermined variance. Another way to control for these effects is to 
include the ratio of outside directors in the estimation since outsiders might find it easier 
than insiders to leave a company and secure positions elsewhere. I also include the 
number of firms directors are serving concurrently in the estimation because of the same 
expectation. Considering the fact that most directors are not outsiders but are promoted 
from inside a company, it is highly unlikely that such behavior like a rat would be 
observed in Japan. In year 2000, 7606 out of 36136 directors who are working for listed 
companies resigned.
10 Among 7606, only 362 directors, or 4.8 % of them got a position 
as a director in listed companies next year. This implies most directors retire from the 
job market after their resignation.  
 The equation to be estimated is as follows: 
 
it it t it it it i it ns Interactio s YearEffect Y X P Const te TurnoverRa ε α α α α α + + + + + + = 5 4 3 2 1 . 
 
                                                 
10 Directors who are working for several companies simultaneously are not included in this 
calculation.  
  10it P :  Performance such as departurse from the industrial median of ROA (Return on 
Assets) and ROR (Rate of Return on Investment). Dummy variable 
for negative operating profit is also used.  
it X :  Natural Logarithms of Asset divided by the consumer price index. 
it Y :  Average age of directors, average tenure, ratio of outside directors, bank director 
dummy, shareholding by directors, number of firms serving concurrently, ratio 
of directors of 59-61 years old. 
it ns Interactio : (ratio of outside directors, bank director dummy, shareholding by 
directors)×Performance. 
 
The level effects of the bank director dummy and outside directors are expected 
to be positive, while board shareholdings might have negative effects. Since directors 
appointed from outside the company are not tied to the firm to the same extent as those 
appointed from within, the average turnover rate is larger for a company with more 
outside directors. The larger the shareholdings held by the board, the greater the board’s 
power, thus potentially making it easier for directors to entrench themselves. 
The interaction terms are expected to capture the effects of the three variables 
on the incentive mechanism. According to the conventional view, close monitoring by 
the main bank should decrease the sensitivity of turnover to performance since the 
turnover incentive is obsolete under close monitoring. Similarly, director shareholding 
should have negative effects on the sensitivity, as the incomes of directors with large 
shareholdings are sensitive to performance such that turnover need not be as sensitive as 
for other directors, and also because directors with large shareholdings have stronger 
control power to protect their positions. The effects of outsiders are expected to be 
  11increasing the turnover-performance sensitivities. Using the US data, Weisbach (1988) 
found that turnover-performance relation of CEO is strong in companies dominated by 
outside directors. If outside directors play the same role in Japan as in the US, the 
sensitivity of turnover might increase with larger size of outside board members.
11  The 
hypotheses to be tested in this section can be summarized as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1 
If directors take responsibility for performance, there should exist a negative 
relation between turnover and performance.  
 
Hypothesis 2 
The level of turnover is a decreasing function of the power of the board, 
which power can be augmented by board shareholding.  
 
Hypothesis 3 
The sensitivity of turnover to performance is a decreasing function of (1) 
appointment of directors from banks, (2) board shareholdings, and (3) the 
ratio of outsiders.  
 
 The turnover rate cannot take a larger value than unity or a smaller value than zero by 
construction. Therefore, estimations by linear regression are subject to serious bias. 
                                                 
11 If outsiders are not monitoring and are merely superior to insiders in finding other jobs as directors, 
they would be more likely to leave a company than insiders when they foresee poor performance by 
the company in the near future, which turns out to be increasing sensitivities of turnover to 
performances. 
  12There are several ways to achieve consistent estimators. One possible method is to use 
non-linear estimation such as Heckman’s two-step procedure or TOBIT. The former 
procedure is difficult to implement as the first step involves multinomial estimation 
with panel data.
12 In order to implement TOBIT with panel data, we have to assume that 
individual effects are orthogonal to regressors.
13  In view of latent variable effects, fixed 
effects estimation is preferable. In order to control for effects through such latent 
variables, I conduct linear fixed effects regression with interior data; that is, I drop all 
the observations for which the turnover rate is zero or one.
14 The drawback of this 
method is a decline in the power of the statistics since a significant amount of 
information is lost. Since the number of interior observations remains sufficient, over 
8000, the decline in power should be relatively insignificant. 
Results are summarized in Table 3.
15 ROA and the Negative Operating Profit 
Dummy have significant effects on turnover as expected.
16 The coefficient of the 
Negative Operating Profit with asset is 0.024, which implies that the turnover rate 
increases by 0.024 points if the profit becomes negative. Since the median of the 
turnover rate is 0.1, the increase in turnover rate caused by negative operating profit is 
not negligible. The same is true for ROA but not for ROR.
17 The insignificance of ROR 
                                                 
12 Multinomial LOGIT requires very restrictive assumptions, while conducting multinomial PROBIT 
is complicated, especially with panel data. Besides, PROBIT estimation with fixed effects is not 
consistent. 
13 Fixed Effects TOBIT does not maintain consistency because of incidental parameter problems.  
14 This method might be inconsistent if the selection of interior points cannot be 
captured by fixed effects. I could conduct conditional TOBIT to obtain consistent 
estimates. I didn’t adopt it because of significant loss in degree of freedom.  
15 Year Dummies are included in all the regressions. 
16 Similar results can be obtained with different performance measures such as the level of ROA or 
ROR instead of their departures from industrial median. 
17 In this paper, I use the level of ROA and ROR as performances. The results do not change much 
when I use the departure of ROA and ROR from the industrial median. ROA is always significant 
while ROR is insignificant.  
  13is not surprising since ROR reflects expectations of future profits. If the resignation of 
directors is taken as good news by the stock market, the ROR might increase before 
resignations occur. The negative significance of ROA is consistent with Hypothesis 1.
18  
The effects of Outside Board on the level of the turnover rate are all positive 
significant, suggesting that outsiders suffer a higher rate of turnover than insiders. 
Board Shareholdings have negative and weakly significant effects, which is consistent 
with Hypothesis 2. 
Concerning Hypothesis 3, none of the interaction terms except outsiders have 
robust and significant effects on turnover. Outsiders and board shareholdings reduce the 
sensitivity of turnover to ROA and ROR. This result is opposite to the case in the U.S. 
found by Weisbach. The degree of the reduction is large so that a board with 90 % 
outside ratio does not react to performances at all. It is also worth pointing out that 
Table 3 does not show any evidence of monitoring by the “main bank”.
19
 
[4] Interaction of Turnovers between Presidents and Other Directors. 
 
Another possibly important factor in the turnover of directors is the resignation 
of a president. Vancil (1987), in his case studies of CEO succession in the U.S., 
suggests that people in management can be regarded as a team in which people move 
together. If this metaphor can be applied to directors in Japan, one might expect mass 
resignation by directors to ensue when a president resigns. 
                                                 
18 It is worth noticing that ROA is predetermined in the regression. Therefore, it is free from a simple 
simultaneous equation problem. 
19 It is also worth noticing that age and tenure have strong effects on the turnover. Age 59-61 dummy 
is also significant and the size of coefficient is not negligible. This fact implies that turnover of 
directors is affected by age and tenure strongly in Japan. 
  14Table 4 contains the results of t-tests. The sample is divided into two groups by 
the occurrence or not of the abnormal turnover of a president. On average, 2.37 
directors resign when the president leaves the board, which seems significantly greater 
than the 1.77 who resign when there is no prior resignation by the president. The 
difference, however, is not actually so large. The same is true for the turnover rate. As 
shown above, the turnover of directors is sensitive to performance. Previous studies of 
the turnover of presidents also show a negative relation between the abnormal turnover 
of presidents and performance. Therefore, the size of the differences in Table 4 might be 
spurious. 
First, I investigate whether the data shows a negative relation between 
president turnover and performance. Following previous studies such as Kaplan (1994) 
and Abe (1997), I estimate the following equation: 
 
() it it t it it it it ns Interactio s YearEffect Y X P rnover AbnormalTu P ε α α α α α + + + + + = 5 4 3 2 1  
 
it P :  Performance such as departures from the industrial medians of ROA and ROR. 
Dummy for Negative Operating Profit  
it X :   Natural Logarithms of Asset divided by the consumer price index. 
it Y :  Average age of the president, average tenure, outside president, ratio of outside 
directors, bank director dummy, shareholding by directors.   
it ns Interactio :  (outside president, ratio of outside directors, bank director dummy, 
shareholding by directors)×Performance. 
 
  15Apart from Abe (1997), most previous studies have used pooled LOGIT to 
estimate the probability of the abnormal turnover of a president. Since my data is 
longitudinal, I have three choices from (1) pooled LOGIT, (2) random effects LOGIT, 
and (3) fixed effects LOGIT. In order to conduct fixed effects LOGIT, I must drop all 
the firms that did not experience abnormal turnover of the president during the sample 
period, thereby greatly decreasing the power of the test statistics. In addition, the main 
objective in this section is not to investigate the determination of president turnover but, 
rather, to investigate the relation between the types of turnover, those of presidents and 
directors. Therefore, from the point of view of maintaining consistency with previous 
sections, the fixed effects model is inappropriate. Then, I conduct the likelihood ratio 
test, which turns out to prefer random effects to pooled LOGIT. Therefore, I adopt 
random effects LOGIT in this section. 
Table 5 shows the results of the random effects LOGIT estimation. The results 
confirm those of previous studies; namely, that the probability of the abnormal turnover 
of a president is sensitive to performance.
20 Similar to Table 3, outsiders decrease the 
turnover-performance relation of CEO, which is opposite to cases in the U.S..  
Because the turnover of both presidents and directors is sensitive to 
performance, they are not independent but closely related. The hypothesis I consider in 
this section can be phrased thus: 
 
Hypothesis 4 
                                                 
20 The fact that the t-statistics of Performance in Table 5 are greater than most previous studies is 
probably because I have used a larger amount of data. 
  16If the board is a team in which the president has real authority over other 
directors, the abnormal turnover of the president should cause consequent 
resignations among other directors.  
 
I conduct instrumental variable estimations of director turnover. Specifically, I 
use an outside president dummy, and age and tenure of the president as the instruments 
for abnormal turnover of the president.
21 Other specifications are identical to Table 3. 
Table 6 presents the results of the instrumental variable estimations. Similarly 
to Table 3, performances are significant except for ROR. The coefficient of president 
turnover is negative, not positive. Therefore, the data does not support the team 
hypothesis.
22 The results in Table 6 have another implication for the role of the board in 
Japan. Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) showed that in the U.S., turnover of a president 
caused consequent resignations by directors since directors were competing for the 
position. If directors are competing for the top position, the new appointment of a 
president would be bad news for some directors, giving them an incentive to change 
company. If this hypothesis holds for Japan, we would expect to observe positive effects 
of the turnover of a president on the resignation of directors. Table 6, however, does not 
show such positive effects, which implies that the hypothesis of severe competition 
among directors is not supported by the data in Japan. 
 
[5] Concluding Remarks 
                                                 
21 All these three variables are significant in Table 5. 
22 If I use the data from between 1990 and 1997, president turnover becomes insignificant in all the 
specifications. Therefore, negative significant effects are not robust.  
  17 
  This paper has investigated the turnover of directors and its relation with the 
turnover of the company president. The findings of this paper can be summarized as 
follows: 
 
(1)  The turnover of directors is sensitive to performance, which can be interpreted 
as showing that turnover works as a managerial incentive mechanism in Japan. 
(2)  No proof of monitoring by the main bank is found. 
(3)  Abnormal turnover of a president depends on performance, but the turnover 
itself does not cause further resignations among directors, which finding casts 
doubt on both team hypothesis and competition hypothesis. 
(4)  The presence of outside directors reduces the level of turnover and decrease the 
sensitivity of turnover to performance. 
 
The above results open up a number of further topics to be pursued. If outside 
directors do not increase the sensitivity of turnover to performance as in the U.S., but 
decrease the sensitivity, what kind of roles are they expected to play on the board? If 
turnover is one of the managerial incentive mechanisms, what is its relation to other 
mechanisms such as wage, bonus, and stock options? Since this paper is the first 
attempt to investigate the turnover of directors in Japan, there remain a number of issues 
to be investigated. Considering the drastic changes in the composition of boards of 
directors that occurred in 2003 due to changes in the Commercial Law, the role of 
outside directors is particularly worth studying.    
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  21Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Mean Median Standard Deviations Data Sources
Number of Board Members * 12.4964 11 6.4228 Yakuin Shikihou (by Toyou Keizai Shinpou-Sha)
Turnover Rate 0.1322 0.1 0.1457 Yakuin Shikihou (by Toyou Keizai Shinpou-Sha)
Return on Assets  0.0257 0.0261 0.0567 Company Financial Data (by Development Bank of Japan)
Negative Operating Profit Dummy 0.1231 0 0.3285 Nikkei Needs
Rate of Return on Investment (%) -3.8717 -9.375 36.8076 World Scope
Abnormal Turnover of President Dummy 0.0477 0 0.2131 Yakuin Shikihou (by Toyou Keizai Shinpou-Sha)
Asset (1000 yen, natural logarithms divided by CPI) 17.8473 17.7057 1.3432 Company Financial Data (by Development Bank of Japan)
Tenure of Board Members (year) 5.5027 4.9334 2.6721 Yakuin Shikihou (by Toyou Keizai Shinpou-Sha)
Age of Board Members 57.2084 57.4000 2.7698 Yakuin Shikihou (by Toyou Keizai Shinpou-Sha)
Ratio of Outside Board Members  0.2469 0.2 0.2260 Yakuin Shikihou (by Toyou Keizai Shinpou-Sha)
Number of Firms Concurrently Working 1.0697 1 0.1388 Yakuin Shikihou (by Toyou Keizai Shinpou-Sha)
Bank Board Dummy 0.3359 0 0.4723 Yakuin Shikihou (by Toyou Keizai Shinpou-Sha)
Shares Held by Board (%) 3.6125 0.6 6.6801 Yakuin Shikihou (by Toyou Keizai Shinpou-Sha)
President Age 61.4504 62 6.6470 Yakuin Shikihou (by Toyou Keizai Shinpou-Sha)
President Tenure (year) 6.4858 4 8.2109 Yakuin Shikihou (by Toyou Keizai Shinpou-Sha)
Outside President Dummy 0.3488 0 0.4766 Yakuin Shikihou (by Toyou Keizai Shinpou-Sha)
Bank President Dummy 0.0414 0 0.1992 Yakuin Shikihou (by Toyou Keizai Shinpou-Sha)
The Number of Observations: 13065 
Sample Period: 1990-2001, Listed Companies in Manufacturing
*"Number of Board Members" does not include auditors, presidents, and chairpersons.Table腀 2
Time Series
mean median SD mean median SD mean median SD mean median SD mean median SD mean median SD
1990 817 14.282 13 6.5253 0.0545 0.0488 0.0358 14.095 9.031 43.826 0.0294 0 0.1690 0.1098 0.0909 0.1057 1.0818 1 0.1510
1991 934 14.211 13 6.7030 0.0512 0.0466 0.0596 -12.874 -15.629 24.736 0.0310 0 0.1735 0.0765 0.0500 0.0972 1.0705 1 0.1333
1992 1059 13.823 12 6.6489 0.0384 0.0339 0.0555 -29.877 -31.917 18.873 0.0567 0 0.2313 0.1278 0.1111 0.1189 1.0675 1 0.1269
1993 1057 13.588 12 6.7092 0.0247 0.0241 0.0457 -2.453 -5.536 23.468 0.1400 0 0.3472 0.0967 0.0714 0.1146 1.0634 1 0.1225
1994 1066 13.232 12 6.5179 0.0195 0.0209 0.0466 14.736 10.221 27.415 0.2008 0 0.4007 0.1273 0.1082 0.1238 1.0685 1 0.1305
1995 1108 12.830 12 6.3361 0.0228 0.0220 0.0468 -12.635 -14.393 19.233 0.1453 0 0.3526 0.1007 0.0769 0.1164 1.0669 1 0.1266
1996 1141 12.700 12 6.4087 0.0261 0.0258 0.0578 24.786 20.217 38.336 0.1367 0 0.3437 0.1376 0.1250 0.1304 1.0676 1 0.1278
1997 1163 12.747 11 6.5200 0.0308 0.0281 0.0456 -21.913 -23.879 22.991 0.0894 0 0.2855 0.1117 0.0909 0.1266 1.0704 1 0.1356
1998 1195 12.268 11 6.3053 0.0246 0.0223 0.0500 -22.316 -26.984 24.887 0.1138 0 0.3177 0.1624 0.1429 0.1475 1.0705 1 0.1374
1999 1205 11.637 10 6.2602 0.0095 0.0152 0.0650 -4.037 -11.445 36.710 0.2299 0 0.4209 0.1780 0.1250 0.2023 1.0658 1 0.1292
2000 1211 10.169 9 5.2607 0.0106 0.0166 0.0669 9.328 -3.649 57.141 0.1453 0 0.3526 0.1740 0.1429 0.1771 1.0718 1 0.1608
2001 1109 9.638 9 5.0306 0.0097 0.0175 0.0691 -0.099 -3.969 34.637 0.1109 0 0.3142 0.1582 0.1250 0.1784 1.0749 1 0.1739
mean median SD mean median SD mean median SD mean median SD mean median SD  
1990 817 0.0233 0 0.1508 0.3329 0 0.4715 0.0477 0 0.2133 0.2252 0.1739 0.2045 0.3488 0 0.4769
1991 934 0.0246 0 0.1551 0.3148 0 0.4647 0.0471 0 0.2120 0.2034 0.1667 0.1888 0.3533 0 0.4783
1992 1059 0.0482 0 0.2142 0.3551 0 0.4788 0.0444 0 0.2060 0.2445 0.2000 0.2162 0.3484 0 0.4767
1993 1057 0.0350 0 0.1839 0.3586 0 0.4798 0.0435 0 0.2041 0.2424 0.1852 0.2175 0.3472 0 0.4763
1994 1066 0.0460 0 0.2095 0.3583 0 0.4797 0.0460 0 0.2095 0.2449 0.1875 0.2219 0.3499 0 0.4772
1995 1108 0.0343 0 0.1821 0.3538 0 0.4784 0.0442 0 0.2057 0.2459 0.2000 0.2211 0.3502 0 0.4772
1996 1141 0.0438 0 0.2048 0.3576 0 0.4795 0.0403 0 0.1968 0.2482 0.2000 0.2262 0.3444 0 0.4754
1997 1163 0.0456 0 0.2086 0.3465 0 0.4761 0.0378 0 0.1909 0.2492 0.2000 0.2277 0.3353 0 0.4723
1998 1195 0.0669 0 0.2500 0.3464 0 0.4760 0.0385 0 0.1925 0.2486 0.2000 0.2272 0.3289 0 0.4700
1999 1205 0.0498 0 0.2176 0.3535 0 0.4783 0.0398 0 0.1957 0.2521 0.2000 0.2339 0.3212 0 0.4671
2000 1211 0.0702 0 0.2556 0.3518 0 0.4777 0.0388 0 0.1932 0.2685 0.2174 0.2486 0.3097 0 0.4625
2001 1109 0.0703 0 0.2558 0.3472 0 0.4763 0.0325 0 0.1773 0.2743 0.2222 0.2508 0.3057 0 0.4609
mean median SD mean median SD mean median SD mean median SD mean median SD
1990 817 56.706 56.818 2.6668 5.6942 5.2106 2.3733 61.863 63 6.6052 6.7013 4 8.3222 3.1687 0.6 5.5751
1991 934 56.616 56.815 2.6986 5.4384 4.9330 2.4993 61.705 63 6.8731 6.8555 4 8.2711 3.1625 0.7 5.6141
1992 1059 56.793 56.933 2.8507 5.6878 5.2500 2.5119 61.539 63 6.9070 6.8432 4 8.0874 3.4710 0.7 6.0538
1993 1057 56.797 56.933 2.7762 5.4876 5.0000 2.5524 61.399 62 6.7258 6.5156 4 8.0788 3.5389 0.8 6.2995
1994 1066 57.099 57.237 2.8180 5.6288 5.1111 2.6818 61.625 63 6.7751 6.7176 4 8.1582 3.4606 0.7 6.3734
1995 1108 57.062 57.250 2.6836 5.4358 4.8750 2.5883 61.424 62 6.8092 6.5939 4 8.3000 3.5817 0.7 6.5642
1996 1141 57.375 57.636 2.6393 5.5617 5.0000 2.6069 61.387 62 6.7260 6.4838 3 8.3131 3.5386 0.6 6.6554
1997 1163 57.272 57.500 2.6702 5.2717 4.6364 2.6411 61.472 62 6.7210 6.5426 4 8.5182 3.6580 0.6 6.7727
1998 1195 57.496 57.667 2.6594 5.3981 4.7500 2.6439 61.595 63 6.4258 6.5699 4 8.3456 3.7152 0.6 6.7718
1999 1205 57.490 57.714 2.6877 5.4443 4.9000 2.7265 61.241 62 6.4359 6.1710 3 8.0376 3.9311 0.6 7.4174
2000 1211 57.811 58.000 2.8743 5.6906 5.0000 3.0864 61.319 62 6.4533 6.2130 3 8.1680 3.9344 0.6 7.5228
2001 1109 57.604 57.833 2.9004 5.3520 4.6923 2.8974 61.014 62 6.3646 5.8070 3 7.9076 3.9210 0.6 7.5109
Year
Year
Number of Board Members
Year Observations
President Age Tenure of Board
Concurrent Numbers
Age of Board
Abnormal Turnover of President Outside President President from Bank
Shares Held by Board President Tenure
Turnover Rate
Ratio of Outside Board Members Bank Board Dummy
Negative Operating Profit Rate of Return on Investment
Observations
Observations
Return on AssetsTable 3
Dependent Variable = Turnover Rate of Board Member
Variable roa1 roa2 ror1 ror2 negaprofit1 negaprofit2  
Performance(P) -0.27878 *** -0.28897 *** -0.0001 -0.0001 0.02435 *** 0.02565 ***
(-5.12) (-5.33) (-1.41) (-1.44) (2.74) (2.89)
Asset -0.02032 * -0.0295 ** . -0.02214 * .
(-2.12) (-3.12) . (-2.33) .
Average Age -0.14274 *** -0.14449 *** -0.14305 *** -0.14572 *** -0.14454 *** -0.14657 ***
(-6.75) (-6.84) (-6.75) (-6.87) (-6.84) (-6.94)
(Average Age)^2 0.00135 *** 0.00136 *** 0.00135 *** 0.00137 *** 0.00137 *** 0.00138 ***
(7.28) (7.36) (7.29) (7.41) (7.39) (7.49)
Average Tenure 0.02041 *** 0.02042 *** 0.01962 *** 0.01956 *** 0.02025 *** 0.02023 ***
(7.04) (7.04) (6.76) (6.73) (6.99) (6.98)
(Average Tenure)^2 -0.00095 *** -0.00095 *** -0.00092 *** -0.00092 *** -0.00095 *** -0.00095 ***
(-5.08) (-5.08) (-4.9) (-4.89) (-5.1) (-5.1)
59-61 Dummy 0.0284 ** 0.02888 ** 0.02935 ** 0.03023 ** 0.02812 ** 0.02872 **
(2.64) (2.69) (2.73) (2.81) (2.62) (2.68)
Concurrent Numbers -0.07589 *** -0.0767 *** -0.07509 *** -0.07623 *** -0.07568 *** -0.07654 ***
(-4.24) (-4.28) (-4.18) (-4.24) (-4.23) (-4.28)
Outside Board  0.04581 ** 0.04573 ** 0.05132 *** 0.05125 *** 0.04477 ** 0.04451 **
(2.94) (2.94) (3.3) (3.3) (2.81) (2.79)
Bank Board -0.00601 -0.00619 -0.00864 -0.00897 -0.01008 -0.01029
(-0.98) (-1.01) (-1.45) (-1.5) (-1.67) (-1.7)
Shares Held by Board -0.00008 -0.00014 0.00012 0.00006 0.0002 0.00016
(-0.09) (-0.16) (0.13) (0.06) (0.22) (0.18)
P×Outside Board 0.33589 ** 0.32951 ** 0.00026 0.00026 0.00909 0.00953
(2.93) (2.88) (1.62) (1.61) (0.46) (0.49)
P×Bank Board -0.09006 -0.09082 -0.00015 -0.00014 0.01851 0.01801
(-1.45) (-1.46) (-1.77) (-1.64) (1.92) (1.87)
P×Shares Held by Board 0.00714 0.00791 -0.00000121 -0.00000113 -0.00095 -0.00094
(1.26) (1.4) (-0.19) (-0.18) (-0.88) (-0.88)
constant 4.27933 *** 3.96724 *** 4.43476 *** 3.98404 *** 4.34145 *** 4.00401 ***
(6.85) (6.54) (7.09) (6.54) (6.97) (6.6)  
Observations 8433 8433 8433 8433 8433 8433  
F 55.16962 57.2531 53.49746 55.25485 55.34523 57.38895
R
†′
0.16169 0.16116 0.15756 0.15642 0.16212 0.16148  
Sample Period: 1990-2001,  Listed Companies in Manufactures 
roa: Return on Asset, ror: Rate of Return on Investment, negaprofit: Dummy for Negative Operating Profit 
*: p<0.05, **: p<0.01, ***: p<0.001
Each equation includes year dummies.
Estimation Methods: Fixed Effects 
Only interior observations are used, i.e., observations with turnover rate = 0  or 1 are excluded
t-values are in parenthesesTable 4
                  T-Tests of the Abnormal Turnover of the President
Abnormal Turnover Yes No   |t|
Number of board members resigned 2.261637 1.691448 6.1219 ***
Turnover Rate 0.211568 0.128264 10.9464 ***
Observations 623 12442
T-tests with unequal variancesTable 5
Panle Logit: Dependent Variable = Abnormal Turnover of the President
Variable roa1 roa2 ror1 ror2 negaprofit1 negaprofit2  
Performance(P) -5.43414 *** -0.00487 *** -0.0059 * -0.0001 0.57911 ** 0.68166 **
(-4.73) (-1.75) (-2.1) (-1.44) (2.62) (3.11)
Asset -0.1602 *** *** -0.18024 *** . -0.15754 *** .
(-3.79) (-4.2) . (-3.69) .
President Age 0.16523 0.15416 0.14447 0.12731 0.16511 0.15203
(1.55) (1.44) (1.37) (1.2) (1.54) (1.42)
(President Age)^2 -0.00058 -0.00049 -0.00044 -0.0003 -0.00059 -0.00049
(-0.69) (-0.58) (-0.52) (-0.36) (-0.69) (-0.57)
PresidnetTenure 0.06151 ** 0.06988 ** 0.05546 *** 0.06367 *** 0.06103 ** 0.06837 ***
(3.03) (3.44) (2.76) (3.16) (3.02) (3.38)
(PresidnetTenure)^2 -0.00267 *** -0.00286 *** -0.00253 *** -0.00272 *** -0.00265 *** -0.00281 ***
(-3.79) (-4.05) (-3.65) (-3.93) (-3.79) (-4.02)
Outside President 0.30892 ** 0.383 ** 0.30462 ** 0.38611 ** 0.3036 ** 0.37324 **
(2.72) (3.38) (2.65) (3.37) (2.66) (3.27)
Outside Board  1.60504 *** 1.83991 *** 1.6862 *** 1.9603 *** 1.73808 ** 1.98455 ***
(7.25) (8.49) (7.38) (8.79) (7.13) (8.37)
Bank Board -0.21193 * -0.254 * -0.21012 -0.25141 ** -0.39296 *** -0.42442 ***
(-2.01) (-2.39) (-1.91) (-2.26) (-3.24) (-3.49)
Shares Held by Board -0.03026 * -0.01926 * -0.03662 * -0.02553 * -0.02971 * -0.02097
(-2.29) (-1.54) (-2.82) (-2.11) (-2.35) (-1.75)
P×Outside Board 5.1654 ** 5.265 ** 0.00186 0.00291 -0.32685 -0.41438
(2.47) (2.53) (0.39) (0.6) (-0.79) (-1)
P×Bank Board -3.85798 -3.77292 -0.00018 0.00012 0.7369 0.69584
(-2.73) (-2.66) (-0.06) (0.04) (3.22) (3.03)
P×Shares Held by Board 0.14979 0.10887 -0.00036 -0.00032 -0.00155 0.00203
(1.02) (0.78) (-1.13) (-1.05) (-0.06) (0.08)
constant -9.47686 *** -12.1687 *** -8.56902 *** -11.4532 *** -9.73928 *** -12.319 ***
(-2.77) (-3.62) (-2.52) (-3.43) (-2.83) (-3.64)  
Observations 13065 13065 13065 13065 13065 13065
Log Likelihood -2246.39 -2253.6 -2263.994 -2272.85 -2247.73 -2254.6
chi2 369.0744 356.6338 332.4419 319.8327 365.6116 356.2248
Sample Period: 1990-2001,  Listed Companies in Manufactures 
roa: Return on Asset, ror: Rate of Return on Investment, negaprofit: Dummy for Negative Operating Profit 
*: p<0.05, **: p<0.01, ***: p<0.001
Each equation includes year dummies.
Estimation: Random Effects Logit
t-values are in parenthesesTable 6
 Instrumental Variable Estimations: Dependent Variable = Turnover Rate of Board Member
Variable roa1 roa2 ror1 ror2 negaprofit1 negaprofit2
Performance(P) -0.29294 *** -0.30211 *** -0.00011 -0.00011 0.02476 ** 0.02597 **
(-5.24) (-5.43) (-1.47) (-1.5) (2.73) (2.87)
Asset -0.01861 -0.02859 ** . -0.02075 * .
(-1.9) (-2.94) . (-2.14) .
Average Age -0.1479 *** -0.14944 *** -0.14882 *** -0.15132 *** -0.14978 *** -0.15163 ***
(-6.81) (-6.89) (-6.81) (-6.93) (-6.9) (-7)
(Average Age)^2 0.00139 *** 0.0014 *** 0.0014 *** 0.00142 *** 0.00141 *** 0.00143 ***
(7.32) (7.4) (7.33) (7.45) (7.44) (7.53)
Average Tenure 0.02085 *** 0.02086 *** 0.02003 *** 0.01997 *** 0.02068 *** 0.02065 ***
(7.03) (7.03) (6.72) (6.7) (6.97) (6.97)
(Average Tenure)^2 -0.00097 *** -0.00097 *** -0.00094 *** -0.00094 *** -0.00098 *** -0.00098 ***
(-5.09) (-5.09) (-4.9) (-4.89) (-5.12) (-5.12)
59-61 Dummy 0.03235 ** 0.03273 ** 0.03389 ** 0.03467 ** 0.03211 ** 0.03262 **
(2.91) (2.95) (3.03) (3.1) (2.9) (2.94)
Concurrent Numbers -0.07814 *** -0.07885 *** -0.0775 *** -0.07857 *** -0.07783 *** -0.07861 ***
(-4.27) (-4.31) (-4.21) (-4.26) (-4.25) (-4.3)
Outside Board  0.05086 ** 0.05073 ** 0.05672 *** 0.05657 *** 0.04867 ** 0.04838 **
(3.17) (3.16) (3.53) (3.52) (2.97) (2.95)
Bank Board -0.00578 -0.00595 -0.00848 -0.0088 -0.01024 -0.01044
(-0.93) (-0.95) (-1.39) (-1.44) (-1.66) (-1.69)
Shares Held by Board 0.00009 0.00003 0.00031 0.00026 0.00037 0.00033
(0.09) (0.03) (0.34) (0.28) (0.4) (0.35)
P×Outside Board 0.32751 ** 0.32177 ** 0.00022 0.00022 0.01302 0.01339
(2.8) (2.75) (1.32) (1.31) (0.65) (0.67)
P×Bank Board -0.09086 -0.09154 -0.00015 -0.00014 0.02127 * 0.02076 *
(-1.43) (-1.45) (-1.76) (-1.64) (2.14) (2.09)
P×Shares Held by Board 0.0076 0.00831 -0.00000050 -0.00000043 -0.00087 -0.00086
(1.31) (1.44) (-0.08) (-0.07) (-0.79) (-0.78)
constant 4.39903 *** 4.11134 *** 4.5852 *** 4.14602 *** 4.46725 *** 4.14944 ***
(6.87) (6.6) (7.12) (6.61) (6.99) (6.67)  
President Turnover -0.08464 * -0.0836 * -0.09328 * -0.09193 * -0.08439 * -0.08343 *
-2.24 -2.21 -2.43 -2.39 -2.23 -2.2
Observations 8433 8433 8433 8433 8433 8433
chi2 25898.6 25905.83 25545.8 25537.826 25931.15 25932.15
R
†′
0.125892 0.126164 0.114943 0.11486911 0.126872 0.126963
Sample Period: 1990-2001,  Listed Companies in Manufactures 
roa: Return on Asset, ror: Rate of Return on Investment, negaprofit: Dummy for Negative Operating Profit 
*: p<0.05, **: p<0.01, ***: p<0.001
Each equation includes year dummies.
Instrumented:  president
turnover
Instruments:  age and tenure of the president, dummy for outside president, and
                  other regressors.
Estimation Methods: Fixed Effect Instrumental Variable Methods
Only interior observations are used, i.e., observations with turnover rate = 0  or 1 are excluded